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Introduction
Offshore tax havens cost the United States approximately $100 billion
per year; worldwide, the revenue losses from tax havens may be over $250
billion.1 Large-scale tax evasion can erode national tax bases, alter the
structure of taxation by shifting part of the tax burden to less mobile sec-
tors of the economy, and distort trade and investment patterns.2 In the
wake of the global financial crisis, increasingly indebted governments have
focused more on tax havens and tax evasion as part of their efforts to
increase government revenues and foster a more transparent global finan-
cial system.3
Perhaps the most high-profile illustration of government action against
offshore tax evasion is the case involving Union Bank of Switzerland AG
(UBS). From 2000 until 2007, UBS assisted U.S. clients in concealing their
offshore accounts from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by failing to
ensure that the clients complied with their disclosure obligations. 4 UBS
also helped U.S. clients open accounts in the names of sham entities to act
as foreign beneficial owners of the accounts; then, because the clients
would falsely provide UBS with the tax form indicating ownership by a
foreign entity UBS was able to evade its reporting obligations to the IRS.
5
Additionally, UBS bankers routinely traveled to the United States to market
Swiss bank secrecy to U.S. clients.6 In 2008, the IRS successfully peti-
tioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida for leave
to serve a summons on UBS demanding that UBS disclose records of U.S.
persons who maintained unreported accounts at UBS in Switzerland.
7
1. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERM. SUB-
COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON TAx HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COM-
PLIANCE 1 & n.1 t2008) [hereinafter REPORT ON TAx HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX
COMPLIANCE], available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
Although having an account in an offshore location is not inherently illegal, legal issues
arise when U.S. taxpayers with financial arrangements in these jurisdictions fail to
report income earned in their foreign accounts or fail to file the required reports with
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See Robert S. Fink & Bryan C. Skarlatos, Foreign
Bank-Secrecy Laws: Making Amends with the IRS, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 3, 2008, at 4.
2. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD), HARMFUL TAX COMPETI-
TION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 14 (1998) [hereinafter OECD REPORT], available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/1/1904184.pdf.
3. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE OECD INITIATIVE ON TAX
HAVENS 1 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40114_.20090724.pdf.
4. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit C, Statement of Facts at 3, United
States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033 (S.D. Fla. February 19, 2009). The U.S. clients were
obligated to provide their taxpayer identification numbers to UBS on Form W-9 so that
UBS could report their income to the IRS by filing Form 1099. Ex Parte Petition for
Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, No. 08-21864, at 3-4 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
5. Id. at 1-2, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009).
6. Id. at 2.
7. See generally Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve
John Doe Summons, In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, United States v.
UBS AG, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008). The IRS stated that the summons
would ask UBS for the names of U.S. clients who held accounts anytime between 2002
and 2007 for whom UBS: "(1) did not have in its possession Forms W-9 executed by
such United States taxpayers, and (2) had not filed timely and accurate Forms 1099
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UBS failed to respond to the served summons.8
On February 19, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal
investigation of UBS ended in a Deferred Prosecution Agreement; under
the terms of the agreement, UBS will provide the U.S. government with the
names of 200 to 300 U.S. clients of UBS's cross-border business, exit the
business of providing banking services to U.S. clients with undeclared
accounts, and pay a total of $780 million in fines and penalties.9 The same
day, the DOJ filed a petition in the district court to enforce the summons.' 0
The court set a July 13, 2009 hearing date to determine whether to order
UBS to disclose the names of U.S. clients to the government.'1 In response
to the petition, UBS argued that Swiss banking secrecy laws, the Switzer-
land-U.S. income tax treaty, and principles of comity militated against dis-
closure of the U.S. taxpayers' information. 12 The Swiss government joined
the litigation as amicus curiae, insisting that the United States could only
obtain the account information through a request under the information
sharing article of the 1996 Switzerland-U.S. tax treaty. 13
Ultimately, the dispute between the DOJ and UBS transformed into a
dispute between the U.S. and Swiss governments and was resolved out of
court. After negotiations that delayed the scheduled July hearing on the
enforcement of the summons, 14 the United States and Switzerland reached
an agreement on August 19, 2009, providing that Switzerland would pro-
cess the disclosures through a treaty request. 15 Pursuant to the agreement,
Switzerland will produce the identities of 4,450 UBS account-holders. 16 In
return, the United States will withdraw the John Doe summons on or after
January 2010, once it has received information on 10,000 UBS accounts
naming such United States taxpayers and reporting to United States taxing authorities
all reportable payments made to such United States taxpayers." Id. at 5.
8. In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, United States v. UBS AG, No.
08-21864 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2008) (order granting IRS leave to serve John Doe summons
to UBS AG); see also Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons at 4, United States v. UBS
AG, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/UBS
Petition toEnforcejohnDoe Summons.pdf ("To date, UBS has failed to comply in
full with the summons.").
9. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit C at 3-4, United States v. UBS AG, No.
09-60033 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009).
10. Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009).
11. See Lynnley Browning, UBS May Face Trial on U.S. Demand for Client's Names,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009 at B4.
12. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 1-4, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
13. Amicus Brief of Government of Switzerland at 11, United States v. UBS AG, No.
09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
14. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 3.
15. Agreement on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of
the United States of America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the
Laws of the Swiss Confederation art 1(1), U.S- Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, LEXIS 2009 WTD
159-26 [hereinafter UBS Agreement], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/docu-
ments/us-swiss-agreement.pdf.
16. Id.
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through any source. 17
The agreement represents a limited victory over Swiss bank secrecy
laws. The Annex to the agreement sets forth the criteria that the Swiss
government will use in determining which accounts to disclose. 18 Because
the criteria for disclosing certain accounts reflect a broader interpretation
of tax fraud, the Swiss will disclose some accounts that its bank secrecy
laws would normally protect. 19 The agreement did not alter the right of
clients under Swiss law to appeal disclosure, however, and some clients
have taken advantage of this loophole.20
The IRS also relied on a voluntary disclosure program to reach more
than the 4,450 UBS accounts processed through the treaty request.2 1 The
program allowed certain offshore account-holders to avoid criminal prose-
cution and pay reduced penalties. 22 The United States and Switzerland
did not announce which accounts were subject to the treaty request for
ninety days following the signing of the UBS settlement 2 3 to pressure
account-holders of undisclosed foreign bank accounts to come forward to
U.S authorities.2 4 The IRS strategy to encourage participation in the pro-
gram resulted in more than 14,700 individuals coming forward, more than
12,000 of them after the UBS settlement.25
Though the IRS regarded the UBS settlement as "a major step" toward
"piercing the veil of bank secrecy, '26 this Note argues that the United
States should not have settled the summons enforcement action by agree-
ing to obtain the UBS accounts through a treaty request. Not only was the
summons enforceable under U.S. legal precedents, what the United States
17. See id. art. 3(4). Potential sources of information include the treaty request, vol-
untary disclosure, the DPA, and the client's waiver of bank secrecy. See id. art. 2 n.2.
18. See id. Annex [hereinafter Annex], available at http://www.financialtaskforce.
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/1 1/Swiss US UBSAnnex-Final.pdf ("Criteria for Grant-
ing Assistance Pursuant to the Treaty Request").
19. See David D. Stewart, IRS Releases UBS Agreement Criteria, 56 TAX NoTES INT'L
563, 564 (2009).
20. See Lee Sheppard, Justice Department Reacts to Swiss Disclosure Case, 57 TAX
NoTEs INT'L 412, 412 (2010).
21. See UBS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1(4) ("With a view to accelerating the
processing of the Treaty Request by the SFTA, the IRS will promptly request all UBS
clients who enter into the voluntary disclosure program on or after the signing of this
Agreement to give a waiver to UBS AG to provide account documentation to the IRS.").
22. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.11.9 (June 26, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/O,,id=104361,00.html ("voluntary disclosure will be considered.., in
determining whether criminal prosecution will be recommended."); Laura Saunders &
Carrick Mollenkamp, Tax Evaders Flock to IRS to Confess Their Sins, WALL ST. J., July 30,
2009, at Al.
23. UBS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 6. The IRS publicly released the criteria on
November 17, 2009. Stewart, supra note 19, at 563.
24. See David S. HiLzenrath, Swiss No Longer Shielding Biggest U.S. Tax Dodgers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2009, at A13.
25. Id. The figures include non-UBS accountholders. IRS Commissioner Douglas
Shulman did not provide a subtotal for UBS. In fact, the IRS pushed back the original
deadline of the program to accommodate the surge in interest from taxpayers. Id.
26. David D. Stewart, UBS to Turn Over 4,450 Account Names, 55 TAX NoTEs INT'L
587, 588 (2009).
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obtained from the treaty request is deficient in substance and as a matter
of future tax enforcement policy. Part I briefly defines tax havens and
explains methods of tax evasion by individuals. Part II describes current
U.S. unilateral and multilateral tax enforcement methods, as well as recent
proposals for change. Part III presents the legal authority supporting
enforcement of the John Doe summons in the UBS case. Part IV assesses
the UBS settlement, including its implications for future tax enforcement.
I. Understanding Tax Havens and Tax Evasion
A. Defining Tax Havens
The term "tax haven" refers to countries that impose little or no tax on
income from sources outside their jurisdiction and have in place bank
secrecy laws that protect the relationship between the banker and the client
by criminalizing the revelation of information obtained from their relation-
ship. 27 Foreign investment activity in a tax haven is primarily financial,
with little movement of real capital; such activity is substantial relative to
the total size of the tax haven's economy. 28 A tax haven typically has a
stable government (the majority are members of the Commonwealth), good
transportation and communications, and a freely convertible currency. 29
In a landmark report issued in 1998, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposed to identify tax haven and
"tax-preferential" jurisdictions by examining the following features: (1)
domestic tax rates, (2) relationship between foreign investment and domes-
tic economic activity, (3) effective information exchange and (4) financial
transparency. 30 The report warned that tax havens often produce dis-
torting effects on trade and investment and threaten to erode national tax
bases. 3 1 The report was particularly critical of tax regimes lacking effective
information exchange and financial transparency, because such features
not only intentionally or foreseeably facilitate tax evasion, but also enable
other financial crimes (such as money laundering). 32 The OECD recom-
mended numerous measures in the areas of domestic legislation, tax trea-
ties, and international cooperation that countries may pursue to counter
harmful tax competition. 3 3 All OECD member nations, except Luxem-
27. See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on Foreign
Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 461 ("[i]n general . .. havens have a legal
system in place that protects the relationship between bank and client").
28. See Robert T. Kudrle, Ending the Tax Haven Scandals, GLOBAL ECON. J., Vol. 9,
Issue 3, at 1 (2009).
29. Id. Commonly appearing on lists of tax havens are Andorra, Liechtenstein, Mon-
aco, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Bermuda. Id.
30. OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-27. Specifically, the OECD proposed to dif-
ferentiate between "tax havens" and "preferential regimes," but considered both types
"harmful tax practices." Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at 24.
33. See generally id.
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bourg and Switzerland, approved the report.3 4
B. Methods of Tax Evasion by Individuals
Under U.S. law, the crime of tax evasion is the willful attempt in any
manner to evade a tax or its payment. 35 Although the means constituting
an attempt are unlimited, there must be an affirmative act by the tax-
payer;36 an omission, such as failing to file a return, is not an attempt to
evade.37 Willfulness under the statute is the "voluntary, intentional viola-
tion of a known legal duty." 38 The trier of fact must generally infer willful-
ness from the defendant's conduct;39 conduct from which willfulness may
be inferred includes, but is not limited to,
keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false
invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of
assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the
likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal. 40
The crime of tax evasion also requires the existence of a tax
deficiency. 41
In confronting the issue of harmful tax practices, the OECD report
noted how international financial globalization has provided new ways for
companies and individuals to minimize and avoid taxes, and in turn how
countries take advantage of these new opportunities by implementing tax
policies designed to attract mobile capital. 42 In addition, the development
of electronic means of delivering services and transferring funds has
increased the potential for tax evasion.4 3
One form of tax evasion is failure to report income from foreign bank
accounts or from stocks and bonds purchased outside the United States. 4 4
Because the United States taxes U.S. persons on their worldwide income,
this income is taxable under U.S. law.4 5 The IRS has difficulty detecting
undeclared accounts partly because the United States does not require
34. Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last War on Tax Havens, 116 TAX NOTES 327,
327 (2007).
35. I.R.C. § 7201 (2006).
36. BNA Tax Management Portfolios 636-2nd T.M., Tax Crimes § I-A at A-1 (2008);
TAx DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 8.04 (2001).
37. l.R.C. § 7203 (punishing failure to file a return as a separate misdemeanor
offense); CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 8.04.
38. U.S. v. Pomponio 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976).
39. CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 8.06.
40. Id. (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943)).
41. BNA Tax Management Portfolios 636-2nd T.M., Tax Crimes § I-A at A-1 (2008).
42. OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. The globalized economy also increases the
potential of one country's tax policies to impose spillover effects on other countries. Id.
43. SeeJANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL AVOID-
ANCE AND EVASION 19 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40623-2009
0709.pdf.
44. Id.
45. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006) ("gross income means all income from whatever source
derived").
Vol. 43
2010 Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy
much withholding information for offshore financial transactions. 46 Indi-
viduals can also evade taxes by channeling their income-earning activities
through foreign entities, such as shell corporations and trusts. 4 7
These abusive offshore tax schemes take advantage of differences in
the way the United States taxes U.S. as compared to foreign persons.48 In
contrast to its treatment of U.S. persons, the United States does not tax
foreign persons (nonresident aliens and foreign corporations) on certain
types of investment income originating in the United States.49 Although
nonresidents are generally subject to a 30% withholding tax on U.S. source
investment income, 50 several types of income realized by nonresidents is
excluded from gross taxation at source, including interest paid on bank
deposits, portfolio interest, and most capital gains.5 ' Thus, U.S. taxpayers
aiming to evade taxes can create foreign accounts or entities to give the
appearance that their assets and income are owned by foreign persons.
An offshore tax scheme might work in the following way. A U.S. resi-
dent could easily open a foreign bank account electronically in a tax haven
jurisdiction in the name of a tax haven corporation.5 2 The individual
could then deposit funds into the account from the United States or from
abroad.53 Finally, the individual would be able to use the funds in the tax
haven account to invest in the United States54
The U.S. information reporting system permits the scheme to go unde-
tected by U.S. tax authorities and thus enables the U.S. resident who bene-
ficially owns the account to evade tax on U.S. source income. 55 Whereas a
U.S. bank that pays interest on deposits must generally report the amount
paid and the identity of the recipient to the IRS, 56 the bank has no report-
ing obligation if the recipient provides the bank with documentation that it
46. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 19.
47. See id.
48. See generally IRS, Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance Schemes: Law and Arguments
§ 1, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/O,,id=106562,00.html.
49. See id.
50. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1 (2009) ("Requirement
for the deduction and withholding of tax on payments to foreign persons"); see also
I.R.C. § 872 ("In the case of a nonresident alien individual . . . gross income includes
only (1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which
is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States, and (2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade
or business within the United States."); I.R.C. § 881 (foreign corporations not connected
with U.S. businesses); see generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG.,
TAx COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND
ENTITIES 2 (COMM. PRINT 2009) [hereinafter JCT REPORT], available at http://www.
jct.gov/x-23-09.pdf.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(b)(4) ("List of exemptions from, or reduced rates of,
withholding under chapter 3 of the Code"); JCT REPORT, supra note 50, at 6.
52. Joseph Guttentag & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in
BRIDGING THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE TAx GAP IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION, ECo-
NOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 99 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005).
53. See id. at 99.
54. See id. at 99-100.
55. See id.
56. See I.R.C. § 6049(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4 (2009).
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is a foreign payee.5 7 Therefore, if the U.S. resident falsely represents on
Form W-8 that he is a foreign payee, the bank will not report the resident's
investment income to the IRS.5 8 This false documentation of status is pos-
sible because information-reporting rules entitle the bank to rely on a valid
Form W-8 if the bank does not know or have reason to know of the
misrepresentation. 59
II. Tools to Enforce U.S. Tax Laws Abroad
A. Unilateral Measures to Obtain Foreign-Based Documents
Among the information gathering tools the IRS has at its disposal to
examine taxpayer books and records is the summons. The IRS may compel
any person to produce documents upon request and compel any person to
testify under oath.60 The scope of the summons power encompasses the
following purposes: to ascertain the correctness of any return, to deter-
mine whether a return should be made when none was filed, to determine
the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax, and to collect any
such liability.6 1 Additionally, the summons power broadly includes
"inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforce-
ment of the internal revenue laws" and obtaining information that "may be
relevant or material to such inquiry."62 The relevance standard does not
require the IRS to correctly determine that the taxpayer owes additional
taxes in order for a summons to issue. 63 Rather, the IRS can investigate
merely on suspicion of a violation of the law, or to gain assurance that a
violation has not occurred.6 4
Federal district courts are authorized to compel compliance with the
summons. 6 5 In an action to enforce a summons, the United States must
prove a prima facie case for enforcement by establishing the following four
57. See I.R.C. § 6049(b)(2) (providing that information reporting is not required for
any "amount" subject to withholding under § 1441 or listed in § 871 (i)(2)); Cynthia
Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or
Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REv. 579, 584 (2004).
58. Blum, supra note 57, at 584-85.
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(1)(i) ("Absent actual knowledge or reason to know oth-
erwise, a withholding agent may treat a payment as made to a foreign beneficial owner
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section."). A withhold-
ing agent can treat a payment as made to a beneficial owner if the "the withholding
agent can reliably associate the payment with a beneficial owner withholding certifi-
cate." Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(1)(ii)(1).
60. I.R.C. § 7602(a).
61. I.R.C. § 7602(a).
62. l.R.C. §§ 7602(a)(2), 7602(b).
63. William M. Sharp & Hale E. Sheppard, Privilege, Work-Product Doctrine, and
Other Discovery Defenses in U.S. IRS's International Tax Enforcement, 32 TAX NOTES INT'L
377, 386-87 (2003).
64. See U.S. v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (analogizing the summons power to
the Federal Trade Commission's summons power, which "does not depend on a case or
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." (citations
omitted)).
65. I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604.
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elements (the "Powell factors"): (1) the summons was issued for a legiti-
mate purpose, (2) the summoned information may be relevant to that pur-
pose, (3) the summoned information is not already in the possession of the
IRS, and (4) the IRS has taken all necessary administrative steps.6 6 Once
the United States makes this showing, "the burden shifts to the taxpayer to
disprove one of the four elements of the government's prima facie showing
or to convince the court that enforcement of the summons would consti-
tute an abuse of the court's process." 6 7
The IRS has the authority to summon information from third parties
that have business or professional relationships with the taxpayer.68 To
discover the identity of unknown taxpayers, the IRS can also use a special
third-party summons, known as a John Doe summons, which does not spe-
cifically identify the taxpayer whose records are sought.69 The IRS may
serve the John Doe summons only after it establishes in an ex parte court
proceeding that:
the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertaina-
ble group or class of persons; (2) there is a reasonable basis for believing
that such person or group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to
comply with any provision of any internal revenue law; and (3) the informa-
tion sought to be obtained from the examination of the records (and the
identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the sum-
mons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.70
Thus, the IRS can satisfy the standard to obtain a John Doe summons
with circumstantial evidence indicating that reporting errors or omissions
have occurred in the transaction at issue; such evidence need not conclu-
sively establish an actual tax violation. 7 1
Where the bank accounts sought by the IRS reside in a foreign juris-
diction with bank secrecy laws, the summoned party may raise the defense
that compliance with the summons will violate the law of that country.
Such laws, known as blocking laws, prohibit "the disclosure, copying,
inspection or removal" of documents located in the host country in compli-
ance with orders of foreign authorities. 72 Blocking laws do not necessarily
66. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
67. United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 2008).
68. See Sharp & Sheppard, supra note 63, at 387. A different set of requirements
governs requests to third-party record-keepers. I.R.C. § 7609(c)(1).
69. See I.R.C. § 7609(0; see generally Frank P. Cihlar, Coming to America: The Extra-
territorial Reach of U.S. judicial Process, 16 J. FINANCIAL CRIME 115, 117 (2009) (describ-
ing the history and legal context of the summons power).
70. Id. A John Doe summons must also not be overbroad. Courts typically enforce
this requirement by determining whether the request was described in sufficient detail
and specificity and whether it was relevant to the inquiry. See United States v.
Abrahams, 905 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).
71. See Sharp & Sheppard, supra note 63, at 388.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
Reporters' Note 4. For example, Swiss law prohibits production of documents or testi-
mony before a foreign tribunal and provides general protection of business and commer-
cial documents. See Jones, supra note 27, at 463-64.
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act as a bar to enforcement of a U.S. tax summons. 73 If the summoned
party faces the dilemma of complying with U.S. discovery and a foreign
rule of nondisclosure, the court will determine which law applies by bal-
ancing the competing U.S. and foreign interests using principles of interna-
tional comity. Under the Restatement Third's approach, the following five
factors are weighed in the balance: (1) the importance to the investigation
or litigation of the documents or other information requested; (2) the
degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated
in the U.S.; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the informa-
tion; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the state where the infor-
mation is located.74
U.S. courts have not uniformly compelled disclosure of information in
the face of foreign blocking laws but have drawn certain principled distinc-
tions in balancing the competing interests. The U.S. interest in maintain-
ing the grand jury's power to investigate tax and narcotics violations has
been found to outweigh the foreign state's interest in its bank secrecy
laws.7 5 Courts, however, have split on whether the U.S. interest in deter-
mining and collecting taxes and prosecuting tax fraud by its nationals out-
weighs a foreign government's interest in preserving the secrecy of
business records. 76 In assessing the foreign interest, courts are likely to
assign more relative weight if the blocking statute is absolute77 and con-
versely will accord it less weight if the statute permits exceptions, such as
for private parties' consent to disclosure. 78
The more recent trend favors compelling disclosure. Whereas prior to
the current version of the Restatement courts would consider the demon-
stration of good faith by the party resisting discovery as a factor in deter-
mining whether to issue the production order,79 the current Restatement
73. See JCT REPORT, supra note 50, at 44-45.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(1)(c) (1987).
75. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1981)
(citing United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976)).
76. Compare United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981) (enforcing a
grand jury subpoena for business records), with United States v. First National Bank of
Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1983) (declining to enforce an Internal Revenue Service
summons directed to production of records maintained at the bank's Athens branch.).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442 Reporters' Note 7.
77. See First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F. 2d at 345 (refusing to compel disclo-
sure where foreign statute clearly provided that release of the summoned information,
even with the consent of the depositor, would result in criminal punishment under the
law).
78. See Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1289 (determining Switzerland's interest was diminished
because the Swiss law at issue prohibited disclosure only if the party whose business
secret is being divulged does not consent). The court additionally noted that the District
Court expressed doubt that compliance with summons would violate Swiss law. See id.
at 1288 n.7.
79. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F.Supp.2d 310, 315 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see,
e.g., Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1288.
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takes the position that the issue of good faith may affect whether the court
sanctions a party for non-compliance with a production order.80 One
court reads the current Restatement as directing courts to consider good
faith only for this latter, more narrow purpose. 8 1 Also undercutting the
resisting party's interests in the current version is the Restatement authors'
endorsement of the U.S. government position that persons who conduct
business in the U.S. "are subject to the burdens as well as the benefits of
U.S. law, including the laws on discovery." 8 2 The only circuit court case to
apply the current version of this provision ordered a foreign party to com-
ply with a discovery order, noting that "although courts should take care to
demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by a foreign
litigant on account of its nationality, a foreign national that chooses to
engage in business in the United States likewise must demonstrate due
respect for the operation of the U.S. judicial system."8 3
B. Multilateral Tax Enforcement Measures
1. U.S. Role in the OECD Initiative
The U.S. commitment to the OECD Harmful Tax Competition initia-
tive has fluctuated over the last two decades with the change of administra-
tions. The Clinton Administration was influential in shaping the OECD's
tax competition initiative. 8 4 Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers con-
sidered the project's objective of identifying harmful tax regimes to be
important "in preventing distortions that could undermine the benefits of
enhanced capital mobility in today's global economy."'8 5 Summers
appeared receptive to the idea that the OECD was establishing a standard
on tax practices to which other countries should adhere. 8 6 The Bush
Administration, however, opposed portions of the OECD's project to target
tax havens. 87 The Bush Administration focused on language in the 1998
OECD report, which was critical of tax havens that drive their effective tax
rates below rates in other countries. 88 Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill
remarked that he was "troubled by the notion that any country, or group of
countries, should interfere in any other country's decisions about how to
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(2).
81. See Linde, 463 F.Supp.2d at 315 n.4.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442 Reporters' note 1 ("This section generally supports the United States position,
subject, however, to the principle of reasonableness.").
83. Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 22
(1st Cir. 2004).
84. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 7.
85. Press Release, United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary
Summers Welcomes OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition Havens (Jun. 26, 2000),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls735.htm.
86. See id.
87. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 7.
88. Id.
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structure its own tax system."8 9 As a result of the Bush Administration's
efforts, the OECD moved away from efforts that appeared to interfere with
other nations' internal tax policies, and instead focused on improving tax
information exchange with OECD member countries.90
2. Tax Information Exchange
One of the ways the United States has attempted to combat offshore
tax abuse is by entering into tax treaties or tax information exchange agree-
ments (TIEAs) with foreign countries. A tax treaty typically has several
purposes, including arranging for tax information exchange, establishing
maximum rates of tax for certain types of income, protecting persons from
double taxation, and resolving other tax issues.9 1 A TIEA is solely for the
purpose of information exchange and typically is reserved for countries
with nominal or no taxes.9 2 In both cases, the United States seeks to
advance its tax enforcement efforts through a formal arrangement. 93 Cur-
rently, the United States has entered into nearly seventy bilateral tax trea-
ties with other countries.94
The United States uses the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention as a
starting point in treaty negotiations, and Article 26 of the treaty addresses
tax information exchange.95 Regarding the scope of obtainable informa-
tion, the treaty obligates the Contracting States to exchange information
that "may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of [the] Convention or
of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes of every
kind .... -96 The language in this provision incorporates the standard in
the U.S. statute that authorizes the IRS to examine "any books, papers,
records, or other data which may be relevant or material."'9 7 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the language "may be" liberally, as reflecting the
Congressional intent to allow the IRS to obtain "items of even potential rele-
vance to an ongoing investigation, without reference to its admissibility."9 8
The Treasury, however, has clarified that the request must be relatively
89. What is the U.S. Position on Offshore Tax Havens? Hearing Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 49
(2001) (statement of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury).
90. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 7.
91. See Offshore Tax Evasion: Stashing Cash Overseas: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. 120 (2007) (testimony of John Harrington, Acting International
Tax Counsel of the U.S. Department of Treasury).
92. See id.
93. See REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 18.
94. See JAcKsON, supra note 3, at 9.
95. 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention art. 26, available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/modelOO6.pdf; JACKSON, supra note 3, at 9.
96. 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention art. 26, para. 1, available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/modelOO6.pdf.
97. l.R.C. § 7602 (2006); see Department of the Treasury, United States Model Tech-
nical Explanation Accompanying United States Model Income Tax Convention of Nov.
15, 2006, art. 26, para. 1, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/
library/TEMod006.pdf.
98. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984) (emphasis in
original).
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targeted. 99 The treaty also provides for protecting the confidentiality of the
information that one state receives from the other, requiring the state
receiving the information to disclose it only to persons, administrative bod-
ies, and courts involved in tax administration. 10 0 Finally, the treaty allows
a Contracting State to refuse to share information in certain limited cir-
cumstances, including where obtaining the information would conflict
with that state's laws. 1° 1
The United States has signed more than twenty TIEAs, many with
known tax havens.10 2 TIEAs are a more recent creation than comprehen-
sive tax treaties. After an influential 1981 report on tax evasion recom-
mended that TIEAs could help close the gap left by the United States'
reliance on double tax treaties with non-tax haven jurisdictions, 10 3 in
1983 Congress passed legislation authorizing the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment to negotiate bilateral or multilateral TIEAs with several countries in
the Caribbean and Central America. 10 4 Few offshore tax havens entered
into a TIEA or a tax treaty requiring the exchange of tax information with
the United States until the Bush Administration Treasury Department
made a concerted effort to obtain TIEAs with known tax havens; this
resulted in the signing of more than a dozen such agreements. 10 5 Some
countries may have signed TIEAs to avoid being labeled as an uncoopera-
tive tax haven by the OECD. 10 6
Although the number of offshore jurisdictions that have entered TIEAs
since 2000 is symbolically impressive, TIEAs impose several practical limi-
tations on U.S. tax enforcement. 10 7 The majority of TIEAs apply only to
criminal matters, which present difficult issues of evidence and are only a
minor part of the revenues at stake.' 0 8 In addition, these agreements
sometimes impose an additional requirement that the activities that are the
subject of the information request constitute crimes in both contracting
states; in cases of tax evasion, this requirement is difficult to meet.'0 9 Fur-
99. The language "may be" would not support a request in which a Contracting State
simply asked for information regarding all bank accounts maintained by residents of
that Contracting State in the other Contracting State, or even all accounts maintained by
its residents with respect to a particular bank. See United States Model Technical Expla-
nation, supra note 97, art. 26, para. 1.
100. Id. para. 2.
101. Id. para. 3. The treaty does not permit a party to refuse to exchange information
on the grounds that the party does not need the information for its own taxation pur-
poses or that the information is held by a bank or other financial institution. Id. paras.
4-5.
102. REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 19.
103. See Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L.
REV 605, 650 (2008).
104. REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 19.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 20.
108. See id. at 19-20.
109. Id. (noting that the OECD model TIEA contains such a "dual criminality"
requirement).
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thermore, these agreements do not override bank secrecy laws. 110 Finally,
and most significantly, TIEAs usually allow for information exchange upon
request only, which requires the requesting party to identify the potential
tax evaders in advance." 1 Thus, on-request information does not help the
IRS discover and find tax evaders but merely corroborates existing evi-
dence. 1 2 Although having TIEAs in place has been said to have a deter-
rent effect against the most serious tax evaders, evidence indicates that on-
request information reporting will not make significant inroads on tax
evasion. 11 3
A further practical hurdle in utilizing the TIEAs is that sometimes the
country receiving the request for information has little information of
value. 1 14 If a jurisdiction's corporate laws require no identification of
shareholders or directors, or little to no financial recordkeeping, it is
unclear what information could be exchanged were the jurisdiction to
enter an information exchange agreement.'
1 5
3. Qualified Intermediary Program
In addition to its efforts to obtain tax treaties or TIEAs with foreign
governments, the United States relies on certain foreign financial institu-
tions to enforce compliance with U.S. tax information reporting require-
ments when its customers' accounts receive U.S.-source reportable
payments. 116 Pursuant to an agreement with the IRS, the foreign institu-
tions, known as qualified intermediaries (QIs), assume certain documenta-
tion and withholding responsibilities in exchange for simplified
information reporting for foreign account-holders and the ability to avoid
disclosing proprietary account-holder information to a withholding agent
that may be a competitor. 1 7 Under the QI Program, QIs need report only
110. Id.
111. Id. For example, the Bahamas-U.S. TIEA "provides that requests for tax informa-
tion must be in writing and contain specified details that include the name of the per-
son, the type of information requested, the period for which the information is
requested, the likely location of the information, the applicable U.S. federal tax law,
whether the matter is criminal or civil in nature, and the reasons for believing that the
requested information is 'foreseeably relevant or material' to U.S tax administration."
See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 332.
112. See Sullivan, supra note 34 at 332.
113. See id. at 333. Sullivan reaches this conclusion by extrapolating from IRS com-
pliance statistics. "When there is comprehensive information reporting (as in the case
of U.S. dividends and interest), the compliance rate is 96 percent. That is analogous to
automatic information exchange. When there is little or no information reporting, the
compliance rate drops to 46 percent. That is analogous to reporting on request. Given
that offshore investors are likely to be more prone to evasion than on-shore investors,
and given that on-shore information reporting is likely to be more comprehensive than
on-request international exchange, the offshore compliance rate when information
exchange is on request can be expected to be lower than 46 percent." Id.
114. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 20.
115. Id.
116. See generally Susan C. Morse, Qualified Intermediary or Bust?, 124 TAx NOTES
471, 471 (2009).
117. See id.; IRS, Qualified Intermediary Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
irs.gov/businesses/international/article/,,id=139238,00.html.
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pooled information on their foreign clients. 1 18 QIs must, however, reveal
the identities of U.S. clients so that U.S. taxpayers receive the same treat-
ment from foreign institutions on U.S. source dividend and interest income
that they would receive if the income were paid to them by a U.S. financial
institution.1 19 In effect, the IRS "trusts foreign banks to certify the nation-
ality of non-U.S. clients and their eligibility for reduced withholding or
exemption."'120 The IRS does exercise some oversight by requiring QIs to
verify account-holder identities and submit audit reports to the IRS.12 1
Despite the benefits the QI program offers to the IRS by overcoming
practical difficulties in administering the withholding tax regime, the UBS
case demonstrates that disclosure obligations under the program are weak.
The QI program, as it currently stands, does not explicitly obligate the QI
to disclose the identity of its U.S. clients who are the beneficial owners of
accounts that are in the name of a foreign corporation, trust, foundation, or
other entity. 122 UBS, taking advantage of this loophole, helped U.S. clients
set up sham entities domiciled in tax havens to retain U.S. clients who
refused to either identify themselves or divest their accounts of U.S. securi-
ties as required under the QI agreement. 12 3 Then, for U.S. tax purposes,
UBS claimed that the offshore accounts were owned by these sham entities
and therefore not subject to the reporting requirements of the QI agreement
with the US. 1 2 4
C. Recent Proposals to Address Individual Tax Evasion
Several proposals focus on the expansion of information reporting.
One such set of proposals involves multilateral collaboration. The Euro-
pean Union (EU) currently has in place a tax savings directive that gives
members an option of either information reporting on all income paid to
foreign entities or withholding tax. 12 5 Were the United States to join the
EU Directive, the United States would benefit by gaining access to third-
party information reporting on foreign investments of U.S. citizens; the
other parties in turn would benefit by receiving income paid to their
nationals. 12 6 This option, or a broader multilateral treaty along the same
lines, could recover substantial revenues lost to offshore tax evasion. 12 7
Another multilateral option for the United States would be to cooperate
with the OECD and other G-20 countries to improve information exchange
118. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1441-1(e)(5); Martin Sullivan, Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax
Evasion, 123 TAx NOTES 264, 266 (2009).
119. Sullivan, supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See JCT REPORT, supra note 50, at 34.
123. Declaration of Daniel Reeves, Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Do Sum-
mons at 13-14, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (quoting a UBS document).
124. Id. at 11.
125. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 21, 28.
126. See id. at 28.
127. See id.
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and to persuade tax havens to enter into exchanges based on the OECD
model.
Expanding bilateral information reporting is another of the proposed
options. Some suggest that the United States should adopt the revised
model OECD TIEA. 128 In contrast to the U.S. model, the OECD model does
not require suspicion of a crime other than tax evasion and overrides tax
haven bank secrecy laws.' 2 9 Additionally, the United States could induce
non-tax havens to make agreements to exchange information, which would
require collection of information on interest payments by banks and other
financial institutions. 13 0 A more radical proposal would be to renegotiate
existing treaties to provide for automatic information exchange.' 3 ' Some
commentators regard this as the only way to bring an end to tax evasion.
Another area of focus for reform is the QI program. Revisions to the
QI program would potentially enable the United States to obtain a great
deal of information about U.S. taxpayer incomes. One proposal is to
require QIs to independently verify the ownership of foreign corporations
and similar entities, which they must already do under anti-money-launder-
ing rules. 132 QIs would also be required to report any foreign source
income of U.S. taxpayers. 133 A further proposal is to require the QI to
share information about foreign clients with U.S. treaty partners. 13 4 To
strengthen the auditing of QIs, proposals include requiring QIs to notify
the IRS of any material failure in oversight, improving the evaluation of the
risk of U.S taxpayers' circumvention of U.S. taxes, and requiring audit over-
sight by a U.S. auditor.135 A final proposal is to close the loophole in the
law that allows the QI to accept the shell corporation as the beneficial
owner. 13
6
A further group of proposals centers on increased enforcement. Not-
ing that the IRS is understaffed, one scholar recommends that it be given
more resources and also that it focus more of its attention on combating
overseas tax abuses. 13 7 Another proposal is to extend the statute of limita-
tions from three to six years for cases involving offshore jurisdictions. 138
This extension would compensate for the delays due to offshore secrecy
laws that the United States often confronts in obtaining offshore financial
128. See id.
129. See id. at 28-29.
130. See id. at 29.
131. See id. The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009),
would allow countries with automatic information exchange to stay off the tax haven
list.





137. Offshore Tax Evasion: Stashing Cash Overseas: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. 39 (2007) (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah) thereinafter Avi-
Yonah Testimony].
138. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 31.
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and beneficial ownership information on accounts. 139
A final set of proposals involves a carrot-and-stick approach toward tax
havens. Although many assume that the benefits of being a tax haven flow
primarily to residents of the tax haven, some suggest that the benefits often
flow primarily to professionals from wealthy countries who provide bank-
ing and legal services. 140 Trading on the assumption that the tax havens
value the welfare of their own residents, the United States, other donor
countries, and multilateral and regional organizations could incentivize tax
havens to cooperate in information exchange by increasing foreign aid. 141
A complementary punishment for non-cooperation could include denial of
the benefits of portfolio interest exemption. 142
III. Legal Analysis of the Enforceability of the John Doe Summons
against UBS
A. The United States Can Establish a Prima Facie Case for Enforcement
of the Summons
The summons the United States sought to enforce against UBS satis-
fies the threshold test of enforcement laid out in the four Powell factors. 143
In its investigation the United States sought to determine whether approxi-
mately 52,000 U.S. taxpayers whom UBS identified as having maintained
"undeclared" financial accounts at UBS have properly reported those
accounts and paid the income taxes for those accounts. Because the IRS is
statutorily authorized "to [determine] the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax," the IRS' issuance of the summons to ensure compli-
ance with U.S. internal revenue laws regarding foreign financial accounts
represented a legitimate purpose. 144 Next, the summons seeks records
that will reveal the identities of and disclose transactions by the U.S. tax-
payers with undeclared accounts; this is not only relevant to determine the
taxpayer's compliance with U.S. tax laws, it is perhaps the only way for the
United States to achieve this purpose. 145 Finally, the summoned informa-
tion was in UBS' control and not already in the possession of the IRS, and
the IRS submitted a declaration by one of its agents that it had taken all the
necessary administrative steps. 146
139. Id.
140. Id. at 29.
141. Avi-Yonah Testimony, supra note 137, at 43.
142. Id. at 43-44.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
144. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2006).
145. Declaration of Daniel Reeves, Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe Sum-
mons at 2, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
146. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition to Enforce the "John Doe Summons"
at 18, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2009). A declaration to
that effect from an IRS officer is sufficient to establish the prima facie elements under
Powell. See United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 2008).
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B. The U.S.-Swiss Tax Treaty Does not Preempt the John Doe Summons
One of the arguments UBS and the Government of Switzerland raised
against the enforcement of the summons was that the U.S.-Swiss tax treaty
preempts the IRS's summons power. 1 4 7 This argument is neither sup-
ported by the text of the treaty nor the relevant case law. Accordingly, the
treaty does not void the IRS's ability to obtain tax information from a party
located in the U.S.
A treaty can only preempt U.S. legislation if the treaty is clearly incon-
sistent with that legislation and, in entering the treaty, the United States
clearly intended the treaty to preempt the legislation. 148 An interpretation
of a treaty should strive to read it to be consistent with legislation to the
greatest possible extent. 1 49 The tax treaty provides that the competent
authorities of the United States and Switzerland are to exchange informa-
tion that is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the tax treaty or to
prevent tax fraud or the like. 150 Under the treaty, the term "tax fraud"
encompasses conduct consistent with definitions of tax fraud under the
domestic laws of both the United States and Switzerland but does not
include acts constituting tax evasion under U.S. law. 15 1 Thus, although
the scope of taxpayer information obtainable under the treaty is narrower
than under the John Doe statute, this is not an inconsistency between the
147. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 28-30, United States v. UBS AG No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009) ("The history
and text of that treaty leave little doubt that the United States understood that the rights
it would enjoy under that treaty, to obtain information otherwise subject to Switzer-
land's financial privacy laws, could not be supplemented through broader and unilateral
domestic discovery mechanisms"); Amicus Brief of Government of Switzerland at
11-13, United States v. UBS AG No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009) ("Enforcement
of the summons therefore would undermine the implementation of the treaty and be
contrary to international law.").
148. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
539 (1987) (noting, in the context of whether the Hague Evidence Convention pre-
empted the discovery mechanisms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that "[wihile
it is conceivable that the United States would enter into a treaty giving other signatories
control over litigation instituted and pursued in American courts, a treaty intended to
bring about such a curtailment of the rights given to all litigants by the federal rules
would surely state its intention clearly and precisely identify crucial terms"); Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) ("an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains").
149. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1902).
150. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income art. 26(1), U.S.-Switz.,Oct. 2, 1996 [hereinafter U.S.-Switz. Tax Convention],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/swiss.pdf. The treaty uses the phrase "tax
fraud or the like."
151. See Department of the Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Convention and
Protocol between the United States and the Swiss Confederation of Oct. 2, 1996, para. 1,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/TEModOO6.pdf. The Pro-
tocol to the Convention defines tax fraud as fraudulent conduct that causes or is
intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of tax paid to a
Contracting State. The Protocol also clarifies that tax fraud for purposes of the Conven-
tion closely tracks the Swiss concept of tax fraud, which exists if the taxpayer has falsi-
fied a document that the taxpayer uses or intends to use to justify the amount that the
taxpayer has reported on its return. Id.
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treaty and statute because the treaty operates as a separate state-to-state
means for obtaining taxpayer information.
In determining whether the United States intended the treaty to pre-
empt the IRS' summons power, the first and primary recourse for divining
intent is the text of the treaty itself.1 5 2 A treaty intended to preempt such
an important administrative power would be expected to state this objec-
tive clearly on its face, given the consequences to each contracting state's
tax authority of having to rely on the treaty as the exclusive means of
obtaining tax information. 153 But the treaty is silent on the summons
power and only restricts the contracting parties' use of administrative mea-
sures in the context of a treaty request. 15 4
In addition, relevant legal precedent supports the interpretation of the
information sharing article of the U.S.-Swiss tax treaty as an optional
means of obtaining tax information. In Vetco, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that the U.S.-Swiss tax treaty preempted the IRS' power to
summon documents from a party located in the United States: "There is
nothing in the treaty barring the use of summonses by the IRS to gather
information. The treaty does not state that its procedures for the exchange
of information are intended to be exclusive." 15 5 The court further con-
cluded that the treaty's legislative history did not indicate such an
intention. 156
UBS argued against relying on the holding in Vetco because Vetco was
based on the 1951 treaty in force between Switzerland and the United
States, and the legislative history of the 1996 treaty worked a substantial
change in the meaning of the treaty. 157 As an initial matter, unless the
language of the treaty is ambiguous, the history of the treaty, the content of
negotiations concerning the treaty, and the practical construction adopted
by the contracting parties are not controlling on the meaning of the
treaty. 158 But even assuming there is an ambiguity in the treaty that
requires resort to legislative history, the legislative history that UBS refer-
ences does not support its argument that the treaty is the exclusive means
152. The Supreme Court has held that "[tihe clear import of treaty language controls
unless application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories." Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citations omitted).
153. Cf. Socite Nationale Industrielle Atrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539. Stressing the need
to consider the consequences of making the Hague Convention the exclusive means of
gathering evidence abroad, the court noted, "[an interpretation of the Hague Conven-
tion as the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively sub-
ject every American court hearing a case involving a national of a contracting state to the
internal laws of that state." Id.
154. U.S.-Switz. Tax Convention, supra note 150, art. 26(3).
155. See United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. Id.
157. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 30 n.14, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
158. See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir.
1994).
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for obtaining taxpayer information.' 5 9 In stating that "[u]nder the pro-
posed treaty, information may be exchanged in connection with the
enforcement of either country's domestic law only in the case of tax
fraud,"'160 the explanation clarifies the scope of information that may be
exchanged pursuant to the treaty but does not speak to the scope of the
treaty itself.161 Moreover, the interpretive analysis in Vetco has been
endorsed by the Supreme Court; the Court held that the Hague Evidence
Convention does not preempt other methods of discovery previously
employed by common-law courts, where it contains no explicit provision to
that effect. 162 This further suggests that the IRS may ignore treaty proce-
dures when it expects alternative measures to be more efficient.
C. Principles of Comity Weigh in Favor of Enforcement of the
Summons
The balance of the factors courts consider in deciding whether to exer-
cise their power to compel production of protected documents and infor-
mation weighed in favor of enforcement. 163
The first factor, the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested, certainly weighed in favor of
the United States. The success of the U.S. investigation into the thousands
of taxpayers whom UBS aided in committing tax fraud and tax evasion
depended on accessing the taxpayers' identities. 164 Further, the informa-
tion the IRS sought was not cumulative of information already produced,
which would often cause courts to not require production.165
Second, the balance of interests favored the United States regarding
the degree of specificity of the request. Notwithstanding that the United
States sought taxpayer information pertaining to undeclared accounts, the
United States drafted a sufficiently specific request on the basis of informa-
tion it learned in its criminal prosecution of UBS.1 66 A summons setting
out the class of names in categorical terms is sufficiently specific to enforce
159. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 29-30, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
160. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME
TAX TREATY AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SWISS CONFED-
ERATION 50 (J. Comm. Print 1997).
161. See Kreimerman, 22 F.3d at 640 n.34 ("it is common for treaty regimes to have
mandatory language that tells signatories what they must do to execute particular provi-
sions of the treaties. But again, such language tells us nothing about the scope of the
treaties themselves.").
162. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aarospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 539 (1987).
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(1)(c) (1987).
164. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (enforc-
ing summons where the discovery sought was essential to the proof of the plaintiffs'
case).
165. See Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d at 1290.
166. See Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-CR-60099-ZLOCH
(S.D. Fla. Jun. 10, 2008) (describing the accounts at issue).
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a John Doe summons.1 6 7 In the summons to UBS, the United States
defined the John Doe class in technical terms and specified a date range of
accounts.
168
The third factor, whether the information originates in the United
States weighed against requiring disclosure. If the requested information
is located in a foreign country, this weighs against disclosure because the
people who must produce the documents are subject to the law of that
country in the ordinary course of business.169 Here, the information
originated and resides exclusively in Switzerland.
170
Fourth, the United States did not have adequate alternative means of
securing the information. The primary alternative channel to secure the
information is the tax treaty between the two countries. In fact, the United
States first attempted to obtain the taxpayer names from the Swiss govern-
ment through the treaty in 2008 but was unsuccessful. 17 1 The United
States anticipated this result because the treaty presented several obstacles
to obtaining the names. First, the treaty requires the requesting party to
specifically name the taxpayers whose information it seeks.' 72 Second, as
mentioned above, the tax treaty allows for information exchange in the
case of affirmative tax fraud only, not tax evasion, and the United States
suspected that many taxpayers under investigation did not commit acts
amounting to tax fraud.17 3 Finally, the U.S.-Switzerland treaty allowed
167. See United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 724 (11th Cir. 1984) (ordering a tax
shelter promoter to comply with two John Doe summonses for documents located in
Switzerland. The summonses sought the "partnership records" of Panamanian partner-
ships, which the promoter had established as part of the tax shelter scheme).
168. The class includes, "United States taxpayers who at any time during the years
2002-2007 had authority with respect to any financial accounts maintained at, moni-
tored by, or managed through any office of UBS AG (or affiliate) in Switzerland, for
whom UBS AG (1) did not have in its possession Forms W-9 executed by the U.S. tax-
payer, and (2) had not filed timely and accurate Forms 1099 naming such U.S. taxpayers
and reporting to United States taxing authorities all payments made to such U.S. taxpay-
ers." Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition to Enforce the "John Doe Summons" at
6, n.4, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2009).
169. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1992); Linde, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 315 ("The only one of the factors that arguably
favors recognition of the bank secrecy laws as a bar to discovery is the fact that the vast
majority of the discovery sought here concerns information that originated outside of
the United States.").
170. See Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Sum-
mons at 44-45, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
171. See David S. Hilzenrath & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Deal Marks End of Era for
Swiss Banking, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2009, at Al.
172. See Technical Explanation of the Convention and Protocol between the United
States and the Swiss Confederation, supra note 151, art. 26 para. 1. "The information to
be exchanged is that which is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Conven-
tion or for the prevention of tax fraud or the like in relation to the taxes covered by the
Convention. The requirement that information be "necessary" to carry out these provi-
sions, which also is contained in the OECD Model, consistently has been interpreted as
requiring only that the information be "relevant". Accordingly, the result should not
be different under the Convention than under the U.S. Model ...." Id.
173. See STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAxATION, supra note 160, at 50; Declaration of Daniel
Reeves, Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe Summons at 4, No. 08-21864 (S.D.
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Switzerland to use its bank secrecy laws as a defense to supplying
information. 17 4
UBS argued that the IRS had received or could receive the information
it sought through other means, 1 75 but its reasoning on this score was
flawed. Although UBS pointed out that the IRS received information on
UBS accounts involving offshore Swiss entities pursuant to the DPA, these
approximately 200 to 300 accounts represent a small fraction of the total
offshore business UBS facilitated. 176 Moreover, the accounts belonged to
entities that authorities reasonably suspected had engaged in "tax fraud or
the like."1 7 7 Assuming that this phrase was given its traditional Swiss legal
interpretation, this group of accounts would have excluded taxpayers who
merely failed to report assets and income. 178 Although UBS also argued
that the voluntary disclosure program would be another means for the IRS
to receive account information, UBS failed to consider that the success of
the program in the end depended on taxpayers perceiving a risk that the
U.S. court might force UBS to disclose additional names to the IRS.
Finally, the interest of the United States in requiring disclosure out-
weighs the Swiss interest in prohibiting disclosure. The United States
undoubtedly has an important interest in enforcing its tax laws and, more
specifically, in maintaining the integrity of its tax system in the face of the
proliferation of foreign secret bank accounts used by Americans to evade
income taxes. 179 Indeed, investigations conducted by several congres-
sional committees' 80 and recent proposed legislation' 8 ' demonstrate the
U.S. government's concern with offshore tax evasion. Moreover, because
this is a civil enforcement proceeding where the United States is the party
moving to compel production, rather than merely a private civil suit, the
court is entitled to "accord some deference to the determination of the
Executive Branch-the arm of the government charged with primary
responsibility for formulating and effectuating foreign policy-that the
adverse diplomatic consequences of the discovery request would be out-
Fla. June 30, 2008) (stating that the John Doe class is comprised of U.S. taxpayers who
chose not to provide Forms W-9 to UBS identifying themselves as U.S. taxpayers).
174. Switzerland "expressly reserved with respect to paragraph 5 of Article 26 of the
OECD Model Treaty (prohibiting a requested State from declining to supply information
because that information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or per-
son acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity, or because it relates to ownership interests
in a person)." JCT REPORT, supra note 50, at 52.
175. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 48, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
176. See Hilzenrath & Tse, supra note 171 (stating that UBS provided the U.S. with
information on 200-300 accounts); see alsoJCT REPORT, supra note 50, at 32 (observing
that there may be as many as 52,000 offshore UBS accounts).
177. See U.S.-Switz. Tax Convention, supra note 150, art. 26(1).
178. See Lee Sheppard, Justice Department Reacts to Disclosure Case, 57 TAX NOTES
INT'L 412, 413 (2010).
179. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (11th Cir.
1982).
180. See REPORT ON TAx HAvEN BANKs AND U.S. TAx COMPLIANCE, supra note 1; JCT
REPORT, supra note 50.
181. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007).
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weighed by the benefits of disclosure."'i8 2
The Swiss interest in maintaining its financial privacy laws, though
substantial, should receive relatively less weight. The strength of the Swiss
interest is expressed by three Swiss criminal statutes that prohibit disclo-
sure of the information requested in the summons.' 8 3 Moreover, the Swiss
government demonstrated its strong interest in enforcing domestic finan-
cial privacy laws by filing of an amicus brief in the case.' 8 4 Nevertheless,
two considerations cut against the Swiss interest. First, Swiss financial pri-
vacy laws do not protect the Swiss government or some other public insti-
tution or interest directly; they merely protect the privacy of non-
consenting private parties.' 85 Second, as a party to a QI agreement with
the United States, UBS was required to report the identity of its U.S. clients
holding accounts in Switzerland. The summons does not infringe upon
Swiss national interests to the extent that UBS was required to disclose the
requested information under U.S. law.186
UBS also argued that its good faith attempt to comply with the sum-
mons is a further factor weighing against requiring disclosure, 18 7 but UBS
erred in applying the good faith factor to the current proceeding. The cur-
rent Restatement only directs courts to consider good faith when deciding
whether to impose contempt sanctions or other penalties if a party fails to
comply; good faith is irrelevant in an enforcement action like the UBS
case. 18 8 Even conceding that courts may draw on the prior Restatement in
order to make an holistic assessment of comity, that version inquires into
the extent of hardship for the party objecting to enforcement of the sum-
mons, a factor that clearly favors enforcement. First, the hardship to UBS
from complying with inconsistent laws is not certain because the bank
secrecy laws do not act as an absolute bar to the disclosure of financial
182. See Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quotations omitted).
183. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 23, 40, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009). "Article 47
of the Swiss Banking Law strictly prohibits the disclosure to third parties of information
relating to Swiss bank accounts." Id. at 16. "Article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code prohib-
its, except with the assistance of Swiss authorities, the collection of evidence on Swiss
territory pursuant to the orders of a foreign court or performed by a party for the pur-
pose of production in a foreign proceeding." Id. at 17. "Article 273 of the Swiss Penal
Code prohibits, among other things, the disclosure of 'trade or business secrets."' Id.
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442, comment c (noting that expression of interest by the foreign state is one factor a
court will consider in determining the national interests); Minpeco, S.A., 116 F.R.D. at
525.
185. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981); Minpeco, S.A.,
116 F.R.D. at 525.
186. See, e.g., Minpeco, S.A., 116 F.R.D. at 525.
187. Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons
at 46-47, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009). UBS argued
it had made "substantial efforts" to comply with the summons, including conducting a
wide-ranging search for information located in the United States, exiting the cross-bor-
der business, and encouraging its account-holders to voluntarily disclose to the IRS. Id.
at 47.
188. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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information. In Vetco, the court noted that where production of bank
records is pursuant to an order of a U.S. court enforcing an IRS summons,
Swiss law may provide a defense of duress to a charge of violating the
law. 189 In addition, when a party could have avoided the prospect of being
forced to comply with inconsistent laws, his hardship is not afforded great
weight.190 In Vetco, where U.S. law obligated the witness to keep copies of
the records at issue, but his failure to do so, in part, impelled the IRS to
issue a summons, the court considered his hardship to be greatly dimin-
ished. 191 Similarly, any hardship that UBS might face from complying
with the court order is a hardship that it brought upon itself by knowingly
violating U.S. tax laws, so its hardship should not weigh strongly in the
balance. A final consideration bearing on the assessment of the extent of
hardship is the status in the litigation of the party resisting discovery. That
UBS was the target of a criminal investigation, not merely a neutral source
of information or a non-party witness, further diminishes the weight of its
hardship. 192
IV. Assessment of the UBS Settlement and its Implications for Future
Tax Enforcement
A. Overview of the Treaty Request
Before discussing the ways in which the treaty acted as a limitation on
the IRS' ability to receive all the account information it originally
demanded, it is necessary to clarify that the treaty request did not strictly
adhere to the terms of the Swiss-U.S. tax treaty. The Swiss government
agreed to interpret the term "tax fraud" broadly; whereas traditionally it
covered only overt acts of concealment, in the treaty request it included
failure to provide a W-9 disclosure form where the custody or bank
account exceeded 1 million Swiss francs (US $992,802) at any time from
2001 through 2008 and generated average annual revenue of more than
100,000 Swiss francs over three years. 193 For custody and bank accounts
of clients engaged in "activities presumed to be fraudulent conduct,"
including using false documents, related entities, and nominees as con-
duits to repatriate assets and using calling cards to disguise the source of
trading, the request reduced the disclosure threshold to 250,000 Swiss
francs. 194 The request also subjected offshore company accounts to disclo-
189. Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1289. The law at issue, Article 273, "provides, in pertinent
part: 'Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign govern-
mental agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise or to an agent of any of
them; shall be subject to imprisonment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a peniten-
tiary. The imprisonment may be combined with a fine.' The term 'business secret' has
been defined to include 'all facts of business life to the extent that there are interests
worthy of protection in keeping them confidential."' Id. at 1286-87 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 1289-90.
191. Id.
192. See Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 527
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
193. See Annex, supra note 18, paras. I(A), 2(A)(a).
194. Id. paras. 1(A), 2(A)(a).
Vol. 43
2010 Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy
sure if their assets exceeded 250,000 Swiss francs. 195
In addition, the United States and Switzerland agreed to waive the
requirement that a request for exchange of information provide clear iden-
tification of the persons concerned. 19 6 Instead, the parties agreed that the
designated threshold levels of disclosure for different forms of tax fraud
and tax evasion would satisfy this requirement.
B. Disadvantages of Obtaining the Accounts through the U.S.-Swiss Tax
Treaty
Given the extent to which the final agreement departed from the
treaty, the treaty itself may seem merely a formality. But the way the IRS
obtained the information will surely influence the way tax havens and their
clients view tax treaties and other U.S. enforcement tools. By consenting to
the use of a treaty request to obtain UBS clients' account information, the
U.S. represented to the world that it is satisfied with the status quo of the
OECD model tax treaty. The OECD standard for information exchange
allows for information exchange only when the inquiring nation knows the
identity of the suspected evader, and therefore it has limited value in the
fight against offshore tax abuses.19 7 During the UBS litigation, the United
States and Switzerland were in the process of negotiations to revise their
treaty to conform to the 2008 OECD standard, which the Swiss regarded as
a major concession because it would expand the scope of allowable infor-
mation exchange to information about individuals suspected of tax eva-
sion.19 8 Switzerland then used its offer to renegotiate the treaty as leverage
in the UBS case, arguing in its communications with the U.S. Department
of State that enforcing the summons would have interfered with the renego-
tiation of its tax treaty with the United States. 19 9 By succumbing to the
Swiss position, the United States seems to have mistaken the appearance of
cooperation on information exchange for meaningful cooperation.
As some commentators have pointed out, treaties should provide for
automatic information exchange in order to most effectively combat off-
195. Id. paras. 1(B), 2(B)(a).
196. Id. para. 1.
197. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income art. 4 para. 10, U.S.-Switz., Sept. 23, 2009, available at http:/
/www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/US-SwissProtocol.pdf, (providing that the U.S.
shall "provide the following information" to the Swiss authority when making a request:
"information sufficient to identify the person under examination or investigation (typi-
cally, name and, to the extent known, address, account number or similar identifying
information))." See also Martin A. Sullivan, Switzerland, Guantanamo, and Tax Evasion,
54 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1068, 1069 (2009).
198. See Asher Rubinstein, New Switzerland-U.S. Tax Treaty Further Erodes Bank
Secrecy, 55 TAx NoTEs INT'L 34, 35 (2009).; Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1069. Since the
financial crisis, many formerly uncooperative tax havens have entered into treaties
adhering to the OECD model. Randall Jackson, Finance Ministers Call for Sanctions
Against Uncooperative Tax Havens, 54 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1091, 1091 (2009).
199. See Amicus Brief of Government of Switzerland at 20, United States v. UBS AG,
No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2009).
Cornell International Law Journal
shore tax evasion. 200 The United States could have shown its commitment
to automatic information exchange through continuing to press for
enforcement of the John Doe summons, as the summons is in effect "a
court-enforced equivalent of an automatic information exchange
agreement." 20 1
The substance of the treaty request also presents problems. A primary
criticism of the U.S. agreement to handle the case through a treaty request
is that the number of accounts to be processed is far less than what the IRS
initially sought to obtain. 202 In several ways, settling for a reduced number
of accounts may undermine the IRS' credibility in strictly enforcing U.S.
tax laws. Most obvious is simply the IRS' failure to fully achieve its objec-
tives. Additionally, the IRS' backing down from its original demand neces-
sitated that it be selective in defining the scope of targeted accounts.
Though the IRS appears to have handled this strategically by requesting
accounts that involved "egregious behavior," accounts that would be diffi-
cult for the IRS to identify, and accounts with high asset values, 20 3 the deal
nevertheless may have left the public with the impression that the IRS is
content to let some forms of offshore tax abuse go unpunished. This prob-
lem is particularly apparent in the case of clients who committed tax eva-
sion, who are only being targeted if their account maintained high asset
values during the relevant period. Restrictions like these show that the
United States succumbed to the Swiss desire to preserve as much bank
secrecy as possible. 204
Finally, the agreement to work through the existing U.S.-Swiss tax
treaty has several disadvantages from a procedural standpoint. Although
the Swiss have set up a special task force to expedite the treaty request
process, 20 5 the agreement provides that the Swiss government has one year
to process the cases.206 Under Swiss law, account-holders who are notified
by UBS that their accounts meet the agreed criteria have the right to appeal
the disclosure of their identity and account information. 20 7 Although the
U.S. government initially predicted that the appeals would likely fail
because the agreement targeted cases for which Swiss law would not pre-
clude disclosure, 20 8 Senator Carl Levin expressed concern immediately fol-
200. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 197, at 1068.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 26, at 589.
203. Stewart, supra note 19, at 563.
204. See Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Disclosure of Annex to the U.S.-Swiss
Settlement Agreement in the UBS Case, November 17, 2009, available at http://evin.
senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=319992 ("the tortured wording and the many lim-
itations in this Annex show[ ] the Swiss Government trying to preserve as much bank
secrecy as it can for the future, while pushing to conceal the names of tens of thousands
of suspected U.S. tax cheats").
205. Stewart, supra note 26, at 587.
206. The Swiss agreed to process 500 cases within ninety days and the remainder
within 360 days. UBS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1(2).
207. See Sheppard, supra note 178, at 413.
208. See Stewart, supra note 26, at 588.
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lowing the settlement about the prospect of drawn-out appeals. 20 9 On
January 21, 2010, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, ruling on an
appeal by a U.S. account-holder objecting to the disclosure of account data,
held that the Swiss government's expansive reading of the treaty "was inva-
lid and that the taxpayer's mere failure to disclose income or to file a W-9
was not sufficient to breach bank secrecy under the information disclosure
provisions of the 1996 Switzerland-U.S. income tax treaty."'2 10 The Swiss
Federal Council, acknowledging that the court ruling put the August 19,
2009, agreement in jeopardy, first commenced diplomatic talks with the
United States regarding its ability to comply with the agreement. 2 11 But
after nearly a month of deliberations, the Swiss Federal Council
announced that it would seek parliamentary approval for the agreement;
until such approval, the Swiss will not transfer any client data to the
IRS. 2 12 This latest development underscores that the significant drawback
of the treaty process is that the fate of the settlement is largely in the hands
of the Swiss government, and potentially Swiss voters in the event of a
referendum. 2 13
C. Need for Follow-Up
An ultimate appraisal of the settlement in the John Doe summons
enforcement action also must consider whether the IRS and DOJ will take
necessary follow-up steps. First, now that the IRS voluntary disclosure pro-
gram has ended, the government must carefully review the voluntary dis-
closures made under the program to ensure that they are complete and
accurate. For example, wealthy individuals may have maintained both per-
sonal and business offshore accounts and maintained accounts in multiple
offshore jurisdictions. 2 14 There is obviously potential for abuse of the pro-
gram, which could jeopardize the program's success. 2 15
Another way for the government to follow-up on the UBS disclosures is
to prosecute a critical mass of the names it has obtained. A steady stream
of cases would deter potential tax evaders from concealing assets in off-
shore accounts because they would perceive the risk that the government
will prosecute them. By early fall of 2009, the government had secured six
guilty pleas of individuals whose names it obtained from the settlement of
209. See id. This point was noted by Senator Carl Levin in his muted reaction to the
UBS settlement. Id.
210. David D. Stewart, Swiss Parliament May Decide U.S. Disclosure Issue, 57 TAx
NoTEs INT'L 411, 411 (2010).
211. Id. at 411-12. (also noting that "[aiccording to the council, it could put the
August 19 agreement to a vote in the parliament. If approved, the agreement would
receive the same legal status as a treaty and its terms would supersede the current
treaty.").
212. David D. Stewart, Swiss Parliament to Consider UBS Deal, 57 TAx NorEs INT'L
731, 731-32 (2010).
213. See id.
214. Lee A. Sheppard, Now What? Dealing with the UBS Account Disclosures, 55 TAx
NoTEs INT'L 700, 705 (2009).
215. In fact, a previous tax evasion compliance initiative involving credit cards has
been reported to be extensively abused. See id.
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the criminal investigation; the government promised to also go after U.S.
banks who helped U.S. clients hide money offshore. 216 The government
can also use the disclosures more indirectly to prepare and serve additional
John Doe summonses on other foreign banks that offered tax evasion ser-
vices in the U.S.
D. U.S. Offshore Tax Enforcement Going Forward
This final section predicts what the outcome of the UBS case means
for future tax enforcement regarding offshore accounts. First, by backing
down from its original position to demand enforcement of the summons,
the IRS has called into question whether it will take a firm position on
enforcement of a future summons or even attempt to use the summons tool
at all. The Swiss have apparently concluded that the IRS will "refrain from
unilateral information-gathering measures that infringe Switzerland's sov-
ereignty and rule of law." 217 If this promise to renounce an often-neces-
sary enforcement tool proves true, clearly it is problematic that the IRS has
hamstrung itself in this manner.
Despite capitulating to the Swiss by agreeing to work through the
treaty, the IRS was able to save face, to some extent, because of the several
treaty modifications that allowed it to still obtain a fairly sizeable number
of accounts. This raises the question of to what extent the UBS case should
be seen as a model for future cases, given that the particular factual circum-
stances of the UBS case were to some extent unique. The extent and detail
of UBS's fraudulent scheme appears to be unprecedented. Furthermore,
the United States has been assured by the Swiss government that it will
"work with the U.S. on similar requests for disclosure involving other Swiss
banks."218 But in regard to a treaty request with any other state, it is far
from certain that that state would agree to relax the standards of specificity
of the request as the Swiss did or to provide information beyond the scope
of its own laws. A tax haven that felt it had already cooperated sufficiently
by entering into an information exchange agreement might be unwilling to
concede anything more.
A further feature of the UBS saga that may distinguish it from any
future cases is the IRS' use of the voluntary compliance program in con-
junction with the Swiss disclosures. Many offshore account-holders found
the offer of leniency to be worth taking; their participation generated sig-
nificant valuable information for the IRS on the extent of offshore tax eva-
sion. Nevertheless, the IRS' need to rely on the voluntary disclosure
program may suggest that the IRS felt the treaty request alone would not be
sufficient to net the amount of information it wanted. Whether the IRS in a
future tax enforcement matter could stake its success on this kind of pro-
216. Kim Dixon, More Tax Cases Versus Wealthy, U.S. Banks, REuTERs, Sept. 26, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58P1VA20090926.
217. See Hilzenrath & Tse, supra note 171, at Al (quoting statement from the Swiss
Embassy in Washington following the settlement).
218. Id.
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gram is perhaps doubtful if the majority of those eligible have already come
forward.
Finally, two positive developments for future tax enforcement that
occurred in the wake of the UBS case are worth mentioning. As it prepared
to receive the 4,450 UBS AG Swiss bank accounts, the IRS announced that
it was "shifting audits of wealthy Americans suspected of offshore tax eva-
sion to an ... office within its Large and Mid-Size Business division that
will be responsible for monitoring what it called the 'global high-wealth
industry."' 2 19 "Responsibility for auditing wealthy individuals had for-
merly been split among IRS divisions devoted to small businesses and self-
employed wage earners and investors."2 20 That task is now centralized in a
sophisticated unit with "the most experience navigating international tax
treaties and untangling complex cross-border business structures."
22 1
The other important development is the addition of the IRS Criminal
Investigations Division to the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. An
executive order directs the task force to bring a wide array of financial
fraud cases, especially cases related to the current economic crisis,
accounting fraud, and money laundering.2 2 2
Conclusion
The IRS had some reason to celebrate the settlement of the protracted
UBS summons enforcement case. This was the first major IRS offshore
banking enforcement action in years and the first against a major Swiss
bank. Moreover, the amount of information on offshore tax evaders that
the IRS is set to receive is unprecedented. At the time of settlement, the IRS
expected it would receive information on 4,450 accounts of taxpayers who
had hidden money offshore in a UBS account. It also expected more infor-
mation to come from its voluntary disclosure program and even hoped that
the Swiss would follow through on their promise to cooperate in the inves-
tigation of other Swiss banks found to be assisting tax evasion by U.S.
residents. Finally, one cannot overlook the deterrent effect of the settle-
ment, both on foreign banks who assist in creating offshore accounts and
on U.S. citizens contemplating opening an undisclosed foreign account.
On the other hand, the agreement to receive the names through a
treaty request and to dismiss the summons represented an unfortunate
miscalculation by the United States. The law was on the side of the United
States to compel enforcement of the summons. But the United States
seems to have fallen for the Swiss bargaining chip -a promise to renegotiate
219. Ryan Donmoyer, IRS Corporate Audit Division Will Examine UBS Tax Evasion




222. The task force replaces a similar task force created under President George W.
Bush in 2002, the Corporate Fraud Task Force, in which the IRS was not included. Com-
pare Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 C.F.R. 222 (2009) with Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed.
Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
437
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the tax treaty between the two countries to include information exchange
standards meeting the OECD model. The OECD standards, however, are
useless in most cases of offshore tax evasion because of the specificity they
demand. Thus, not only must the United States now cope with a treaty
process that will yield fewer names than if the summons had been
enforced, the United States will gain very little from the new treaty going
forward. The delays in the treaty process resulting from the Swiss court
ruling rejecting the August 2009 agreement make the bargain appear even
less defensible.
Finally, even if the case represents progress in the effort to end bank
secrecy abuses, this does not mean that the fight is over. The case exposed
the extent to which foreign banks in bank secrecy jurisdictions have been
routinely selling tax evasion services to Americans and other wealthy indi-
viduals around the world, underscoring that UBS is just one small part of
the problem. To truly capitalize on the resolution of the UBS case, the IRS
must expend the necessary resources to pursue all leads from the informa-
tion it has received. Now that the IRS has taken an initial step in attacking
large-scale offshore tax evasion, it is in a unique position to continue to
demand information disclosure and the loosening of bank secrecy.
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